Two-hop security communication with an eavesdropper in wireless environment is a hot research direction. The basic idea is that the destination, simultaneously with the source, sends a jamming signal to interfere the eavesdropper near to or co-located with the relay. Similar as physical layer network coding, the friendly jamming signal will prevent the eavesdropper from detecting the useful information originated from the source and will not affect the destination on detecting the source information with the presence of the known jamming signal. However, existing investigations are confined to Gaussian distributed signals, which are seldom used in real systems. When finite constellation signals are applied, the behavior of the secrecy rate becomes very different. For example, the secrecy rate depends on phase difference between the input signals with finite constellations, which is not observed with Gaussian signals. In this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity and derive its upper bound for the two-hop relay model, by assuming an eavesdropper near the relay and the widely used M-PSK modulation. With our upper bound, the best and worst phase differences in high SNR region are then given. Numerical studies verify our analysis and show that the derived upper bound is relatively tight.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, signal transmission in wireless environment is faced with a variety of security threats (e.g. interference, eavesdroppers, malicious node, untrusted relay, etc.). Therefore, secrecy plays an important role in wireless networks and draws a lot of research attentions. Wyner investigated the wiretap channel [1] and showed that secure communication is possible in spite of the existence of an unauthorized intruder, under the condition that it can only observe degraded signals. For the general Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel (GGMAC-WT) and the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel (GTW-WT), a corresponding secrecy measure is defined, and achievable secrecy rate regions are determined in [2] . A secure two-hop communication model with an untrusted relay is considered in [3] [4] [5] [6] . In these works, the untrusted relay was confused by a friendly jamming signal to prevent the relay from decoding useful information originated from the source, where the jamming signal could be sent by the destination or an external friendly node. This idea is the same as the security mechanism of physical layer network coding [7] [8] .
We find that all the papers above were studied under the assumption of Gaussian distributed signal, including both the jamming and data signals. However, Gaussian distributed signals are rather theoretical and are seldom used in practical systems. More important, there is quite a little difference when practical finite constellations signals are adopted, especially taking the phase difference between the input signals into consideration. This scenario has only been noted in the area of Gaussian interference channel (GIC) and Gaussian multiple access channel. In [9] , the two-user GIC with finite constellation-based transmitted signal is studied, and it is verified that if one user rotates its constellation appropriately with respect to the constellation of the other user, the achievable sum-rate in the network increases considerably. In [10] [11] [12] , Constellation Constrained (CC) capacity region of two-user Single-Input Single-Output (SISO) Gaussian Multiple Access Channel are investigated under two schemes (non-orthogonal MA and orthogonal MA). To guarantee unique decodability property, appropriate rotation between the input constellations (such as M-PSK, M-QAM) is employed by the NO-MA scheme, with the objective of maximally enlarging the CC capacity. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work that discusses the finite constellation's effect on secure transmission.
In this paper, we adopt the two-hop relay channel model as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume that there is an eavesdropper near the relay, which can overhear the transmissions from both the source and the relay. If we do not protect the transmitted signals, the eavesdropper has a high chance to recover the information when the signal strengths are high enough to guarantee correct detection at the destination. To keep the information secret from the eavesdropper 1 , one effective way is to send an artificial interference from the destination to jamming the eavesdropper when the source is transmitting to the relay. This model is similar to the scenario where the relay node is untrusted [3] [4] [5] [6] , and the relay together with the eavesdropper co-located in the same entity.
Different from existing friendly interference works, which only consider Gaussian signal and jamming signal, we investigate secure transmissions where both the source and the destination only explore the widely used PSK modulations. This practical constellations assumption is not only reasonable in real wireless system, but also makes sense in theory. As a result, the secrecy rate is affected by the phase difference between the source and the destination, and this fact is not observed with Gaussian distributed signals. With this discovery, the transmitter could control the phase differences so as to increase the secrecy rate.
To derive the upper bound for secrecy rate, we apply the rate equivocation inequality in [11] and the information theory formulation. Due to PSK signals, when the phase difference is changed, the upper bound will be different. Since there is no closed-form expression for the upper bound of secrecy rate with varying phase difference, we only perform numerical study to reflect the change.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, we present the system model; in section III, we derive the secrecy rate using information theory technique; in section IV, we derive an upper bound of the secrecy rate, and, we show the simulation results and conclusion in the last two sections, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Refer to Figure 1 , S denotes the source, R denotes the relay, D denotes the destination, and E denotes the eavesdropper, which is adjacent to the relay. Solid lines represent the multiple-access (MA) phase, and dashed lines represent the broadcast (BC) phase. PSK-modulated signals s X and d X denote the signals from the source and the destination respectively, where s X contains confidential message, and d X is the jamming signal from the destination to the relay at the same time with s X . We consider the scenario where the information originated from the source is not encrypted. Hence, we need a jamming signal to protect it from eavesdropping.
We assume that there are n signals transmitted during the MA phase, and m signals transmitted during the BC phase. We assume that the relay adopts amplify-and-forward (AF) scheme. We hence have n m , and we use W to represent the confidential message contained in s X .
Because of PSK signals, we can let the constellation of signal adopt the M-PSK scheme. The source packet where the noise vector 2 n N is also a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance. Hereafter, we ignore the superscript n, since the length of all vector signals is fixed.
In the BC phase, the relay broadcasts signal 1 
'
Y , which is computed from 1 Y . We assume the relay adopts AF. So, we can get:
where the amplification factor is a constant number either larger than 1 or smaller than 1, determined by the power constraint of the relay.
The signal received by the destination in the BC phase is denoted by 2 Y , given by:
N is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance.
Correspondingly, let ' e Y denote the signal received by the eavesdropper during the BC phase, which is given by:
where 4 N is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance.
From (2), (3), and (5), we know that the eavesdropper receives two copies that carry the information. It can combine these two copies using the optimal maximal ratio combining (MRC). The final expression for the signal obtained by the eavesdropper is hence: . At the destination, the self-interference can be total removed from 2 Y and the final signal can be expressed by:
III. SECRECY RATE
The eavesdropper will make full use of what it received to gain the confidential message. Hence the secrecy constraint can be denoted as:
It means that the eavesdropper could obtain some information about s X containing the confidential message W, nonetheless, it can't get any useful information about W.
With satisfying of (9), the secrecy rate e R can be defined as:
Due to the optimality of the MRC in (7) , we can get: In Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity equals to the difference between the main and overall eavesdropper channel capacities [11] . From Shannon Theory, the achievable secrecy rate region is given as:
where the right hand side of inequality (12) is wire-tap channel capacity according to [11] , and it is maximized when p(x) is Gaussian distribution 2 . In this system, for M-PSK modulation, each symbol is chosen with equal probability from the M constellations and p(x) is fixed. By spreading the right hand side of (12), we get: VI. CONCLUSION A two-hop secure Gaussian channel was studied based on finite constellations. It was found that when the different phase between the two users' (source node and destination node) constellations applied, the secrecy capacity varies. We gave the best and worst phase differences in an analytical way in high SNR region by deriving an upper bound. Numerical simulations not only verified our analysis but also showed the effect of SNR on secrecy rate. With the result in our paper, we can carefully design the transmission power and phase difference to maximize the system secrecy rate.
